

OGC 64-0300

6 FEB 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Representative John V. Lindsay (R., New York)

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. On 15 August 1963, Lindsay for the first time introduced a Joint Resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence. (Attachment A) At that time he gave a long and detailed discussion of his reasons to recommend establishment of a Joint Committee and this speech will be dealt with in detail. (Attachment B)
3. Lindsay is considered a liberal Republican who campaigned for civil rights, better housing, and mutual aid and trade. He was elected to the 86th Congress and was reelected in the 87th and 88th. He was born in 1921 in New York City, graduated from Yale Law School, and practiced law in New York. He is from the Seventeenth so-called "Silk Stocking" District of Manhattan. He was in the Navy during the war and for two years, from 1955 to 1957, was Executive Assistant to Attorney General Brownell. He has a generally fine reputation and is regarded as an intelligent, enlightened public servant. He is considered a "comer." His only Committee is Judiciary.
4. Until March of 1963, Agency relations with Lindsay were not frequent but were good. Examples of our experience with Lindsay are:
 - a. Mr. Lindsay was most interested in the Tibetan refugee problem and in December 1960 we took Gyalo Thondup to meet him and gave him a general briefing on the Tibetan situation. As a result, Mr. Lindsay said he would do all he could to educate his fellow congressmen on the Tibetan question and was very appreciative.

b. In May 1961, Mr. Lindsay asked for help in responding to his constituents on the Cuban situation, particularly those criticizing or mentioning the Agency and intelligence. We met with him and discussed the situation in some detail. Mr. Lindsay was most appreciative and closed with an offer to be of any assistance to the Agency in any way he could.

In March of 1963, Mr. Lindsay indicated he desired (i) Agency views on the creation of a Joint Supervisory Committee of the Congress; (ii) briefing on the extent the Agency is supporting the International Commission of Free Jurists; and (iii) the Agency regular briefing on current activities in Cuba. Acting on policy guidance, Mr. Lindsay was informed, in the politest possible way, that we could not be of assistance. Lindsay was obviously displeased at the negative response.

5. In the 6 April 1963 issue of THE NEW REPUBLIC, in an article by Murray Kempton, there appears what purports to be a quotation from Lindsay discussing this incident. (Attachment C) The quotations do not reflect accurately the Agency discussion with Lindsay, but clearly indicate Lindsay's displeasure with the Agency.

6. The resolution which Lindsay introduced is somewhat different from others in that it includes in its title "Foreign Information" as well as "Intelligence." The resolution defines "information and intelligence agency of the United States" to mean USIA, CIA and any unit in the departments or agencies conducting foreign information or intelligence activities naming State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, but excludes domestic operations of the FBI. He gives two general reasons for thinking such a committee should be established: (i) the extraordinary number of specific criticisms that have been levelled over the years against the CIA and by implication against the intelligence community as a whole; (ii) "I abhor government by secrecy. I regard it as inimical to the effective function of our institutions." At the same time Lindsay states that he realizes a "high degree of secrecy is essential to the workings of the intelligence community."

7. Mr. Lindsay proposes four questions of high importance which "might usefully be investigated:"

1. Relations between CIA and the State Department, especially overseas;
2. the housing of so-called special operations under the same roof as the CIA's purely intelligence gathering activities;
3. selection, recruitment and training of intelligence personnel; and
4. the whole question of intelligence evaluation.

That floor speech is analyzed in detail in Attachment D by listing his arguments or charges which Lindsay asserts support the establishment of a Joint Committee to investigate the four questions listed above.

8. Interspersed through this floor speech are numerous references to specific CIA blunders and examples of independent policy actions. These accusations are listed below and in Attachment E each of these is discussed:

1. Failure of the intelligence community to anticipate the Chinese Communists intervention in Korea.
2. The Nasser incident of 1956 where reportedly a CIA official advised Nasser to ignore a message Nasser was about to receive from the State Department.
3. So-called Bay of Pigs fiasco.
4. Support by CIA of the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist armies in Northern Burma without the knowledge of the Ambassador at Rangoon.
5. Lack of coordination by the CIA and State Department in the early stages of the Laotian crisis.
6. Lack of coordination between State Department and CIA in Cuba where CIA established working relations with exile supporters of the former dictator, Batista.
7. CIA hand in the uprisings in East Berlin and Hungary.

Lindsay asserts that operations of the type described above "unless carefully supervised and controlled by responsible political officers could unwittingly involve the United States in major international crisis, possibly in war."

9. To summarize the detailed analysis it can be said that one of the main points is Lindsay's charge that congressional supervision of the Agency is inadequate and implicit in this statement is that the existing Subcommittees are not fulfilling their responsibilities. He concedes the necessity for secrecy and states this is no argument against a Joint Committee citing the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. He also rejects the argument that CIA exists to serve the President and the executive branch. Lindsay lists a number of specific intelligence failures or actions to support his view that a Joint Committee should study the problems. He recognizes the problem of special operations being included with CIA's intelligence function but offers no solution other than to have a Joint Committee study it. He touches on the question of selection and training of intelligence personnel admitting the Agency has some of the ablest minds in Government but speculating that the quality of personnel is one of the problems. He says it has a damaging effect. He then concedes lack of specific knowledge but again offers the solution of having the Joint Committee study it. He discusses at some length the problem of evaluation of intelligence indicating that this is one of the most important problems. In this connection he charges that the Agency is player and umpire, both witness and judge. No solution is offered except to have the Joint Committee study it.

10. Since August Lindsay has made no further floor statements except on 3 October when he referred to the South Vietnam situation and comments on the reports that there has been a breakdown in communications between CIA and the State Department inside South Vietnam. He again calls for action on his resolution for a Joint Committee. (Attachment F)

25X1A9a



Legislative Counsel

Atts. - 6

Distribution:

Orig - DCI

1 - ER

1 - ADD/P

✓ 1 - Asst. to DCI (Chretien)

1 - ADD/I (Management)

4